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At the center of what it means to be democratic is the commitment to equality.
This commitment emerges in our talk about public policies, in our talk about
careers and economic opportunity, and in our talk about education . In light
of equality, we say, we must overlook differences among individuals in order
to treat everyone as the same. When the so-called playing field is not "level,"
we think it undermines equality and ought to be changed so that the ideal of
equality can be more nearly achieved. At the same time, democracy seems to
call for a parallel commitment to maintaining the distinctiveness of individu-
als . In this case, public policies, economic processes, education, and so on are
thought about in a way that supports individual development and opportunity.
Difference, in this case, is a goal, not a hindrance, and is what makes the level
playing field worth having . This tension within the context of a democratic so-
ciety is manifest as well in its institutions, including those most central to the
education of a democratic citizenry-public universities . Such institutions cap-
ture their democratic commitments in a variety of policy statements and pro-
grams and make the tension most clear in their overall mission statements. My
own institution, the University of Oregon, makes the commitments to equality
and distinctive individuals central to the education we provide when we say in
our mission that the university is dedicated to "the principles of equality of op-
portunity and freedom from unfair discrimination for all members of the uni-
versity community and an acceptance of true diversity as an affirmation of in-
dividual identity within a welcoming community."'
The mission statement, however, complicates the matter. Not only does it
affirm the commitment to equality and the importance of individuals, but it
also asks for an acceptance of "true diversity." At one level, this is to say no more
than I have said-democracy and, by extension education in a democracy, ought
to foster individual distinctiveness, "true diversity." But the moment one starts
to talk about individual distinctiveness in relation to differences of gender or
race there is a problem. Doesn' t recognition of race difference, for example, un-
dermine equality by highlighting an aspect of individuals that cannot be shared
by all? Not everyone, of course, is white nor is everyone black, and, given our
usual understanding of being white or black, they can never be . At the same
time, the recognition of race difference seems to undermine the commitment
to individuals as well. To emphasize individuality is to emphasize what makes
f
a person different from everyone else, but to recognize that someone is African
American or that someone is white is to fail to recognize them as individuals-as
Peter or Patricia-and instead to recognize them for the groups to which their
skin color connects them. In fact, if racism is understood as practices which
violate our commitments to equality and individuality because of race, then it
seems that recognizing race is itself a form of racism . In light of this sort of
argument, some people, black and white, are ready to set aside the notion of race
because it is an obstacle to ending racism .'
At the same time, others argue that the only way to solve the problem of rac-
ism and other forms of oppression based on difference is to address the problem
on its own terms. The response to discrimination against blacks in hiring or
college admissions is something that calls for the identification of people's races
in order to change the practices of discrimination . One cannot argue that there
are no black faculty members in a philosophy department or black students in
an entering class unless one is willing to identify the racial backgrounds of the
faculty and students. We cannot even get a sense of whether or not things are
changing without systematically recognizing racial difference . To do so from the
perspective of democracy, however, is to be in tension with the commitments
to equality and individuality. Again, the recognition of race runs the risk of
becoming identified with racism.
Individuality and Diversity
Once race and racism are taken together, it becomes hard to see how race
difference can fit in the context of education in a democracy. For students of
color, the identification of race and racism devalues and excludes a crucial as-
pect of experience-because it connects racial identity with the acknowledged
evil of racism. For white students, the connection amounts to permission to
disregard the role and construction of race and so to unwittingly perpetuate the
oppression that we are otherwise quick to acknowledge in the process and in-
stitutions of education.
For most of us, however, the "reasoned" argument does not persuade . Even
if our commitments to equality and individuality seem necessarily at odds with
our commitment that race matters, we nevertheless remain committed to each.
The problem, I want to suggest, is not that any of these commitments ought to
be suspended, but that they need to be rejoined with a different conception of
identity and humanity.' Rather than viewing human beings as individuals ac-
cidentally born into various circumstances with bodies that aren't relevant to
our humanity, we need to reconceptualize human beings as fundamentally em-
bodied, and so gendered, racial, and historical beings . To deny the importance
or relevance of race in our social relations, or to think that by acknowledging
race we have only racism, is to misconceive humanity.
The source of the alternative view I will propose is found in the work of
W. E. B. Du Bois . When, in 1903, Du Bois declared that the "problem of the
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20th century is the problem of the color-line," he did not also declare that the
solution was its elimination . Rather, Du Bois argued for the conservation of
races and, in that sense, the preservation of the color line, reconstructed in a way
that recognized that talk of race, thinking about race, identifying by race, is not
fundamentally racist but fundamentally a source of enrichment, insight, and
growth for individuals and for the wider community . This approach, grounded
in pragmatic pluralist commitments like those of William James, Jane Addams,
and John Dewey, aimed at transformation of American society by offering an
alternative to the "melting pot" on one hand, and racial apartheid on the other .'
In his controversial 1897 paper "The Conservation of Races ;" Du Bois argued
that races be conserved on the grounds that each race had a contribution to
make to humanity as a whole . In this light, he argued that African Americans,
as part of the African or black race, had a responsibility to help maintain racial
distinctiveness even in the oppressive world of American apartheid . On this
view, to talk about race is not to be racist in the usual sense, but rather to par-
ticipate in a dialogue that helps to develop a kind of distinctiveness indispen-
sable to the character and development of human beings . Rather than under-
mining democratic commitments, Du Bois aimed to provide a means by which
democracy would actually be supported by the recognition of race . Under this
reconstructed notion of race, democracy itself is transformed from a society
that emphasizes the priority of individuals of the sort presented by J . S . Mill and
classical liberal thinkers, to a society in which individuals share priority with
groups . Du Bois says, "the history of the world is the history, not of individuals,
but of groups, not of nations, but of races, and he who ignores or seeks to over-
ride the race idea in human history ignores and overrides the central thought
of all history" (Du Bois 1897, p . 817).
In order to make sense of this transformed notion of democracy, we must
understand the relationship between individuals and races . Du Bois defines a
race as "a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and lan-
guage, always of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both vol-
untarily and involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain
more or less vividly conceived ideals of life " (Du Bois 1897, p . 817) . The defini-
tion points out three important features of Du Bois's notion of race . First, the
notion that race is "a vast family . . . generally of common blood and language"
suggests that race depends in part on aspects of ourselves that come to mind
when we talk about family resemblance . From one angle, it means that a simi-
larity of look and speech more or less places individuals in relation to each other.
From another angle the idea of a vast family makes the connection among peo-
ple depend upon our most intimate physical and emotional connections-our
bodies, our earliest memories, our expected inheritances . In effect, race is physi-
cally in the bodies of individuals, an inheritance of the most direct kind . Sec-
ond, the idea that race is a matter of a shared or common history suggests that
race depends not just on the connection between members of the "family," but
also upon the shared story of its own development and its struggles, misfor-
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tunes, failures, and successes in interactions with other groups . Third, the idea
that a common "voluntary and involuntary striving " asserts that races are not
only inherited bodies and histories, but are also in part joined by visions of a
shared but distinctive future.
Some current theorists of race try to reduce race to questions of morpho-
logical differences . From this perspective, the lack of a definitive biological basis
for the differences then supports arguments that race is a meaningless category .'
Other race theorists, especially in light of the problems that follow from reliance
on morphological differences, reduce the idea of race to a matter of culture or
ethnicity, preserving racial distinctiveness but converting it to a set of beliefs
and practices that can be shared by alL 6 Du Bois will not permit either a reduc-
tion of race to physical difference or a reduction of race to ethnicity . He says,
"But while race differences have followed mainly physical race lines, yet no mere
physical distinctions would really define or explain the deeper differences-the
cohesiveness and continuity of these groups. The deeper differences are spiri-
tual, psychical, differences-undoubtedly based on the physical, but infinitely
transcending them" (Du Bois 1897, p . 818).
From this perspective, races as groups are not sharply defined genetic (or an-
cestral) groups, or communities of individuals who share only a particular set
of established customs and beliefs, or even more or less random groups joined
in the face of particular political or economic need . They are ongoing, distinc-
tive groups of individuals who have a richly shared past-in physical inheri-
tance, cultural practices, and remembered history. Since Du Bois, like James and
Dewey, believes that what we can do depends upon what we bring to the process,
racial distinctiveness understood in this complex way has a direct bearing on
the things that people produce, the ideas they have and share, their art, litera-
ture, ambitions, and constraints. Taken together these distinctive productions
dependent on a racial past, present, and future are what Du Bois calls racial
"gifts ." Viewed from the standpoint of human community, these gifts amount
to the means by which human beings grow as individuals and by which human
groups develop, innovate, and enrich each other . To lose such "gifts" reduces the
potential for human flourishing; to conserve them is to foster growth. Racial
"gifts," then, justify the conservation of races. Du Bois concludes, "We believe
that the Negro people, as a race, have a contribution to make to civilization and
humanity, which no other race can make. . . . We believe it the duty of Ameri-
cans of Negro descent, as a body, to maintain their race identity until [the] mis-
sion of the Negro people is accomplished, and the ideal of human brotherhood
has become a practical possibility" (Du Bois 1897, p . 825) .'
For Du Bois, the features that define race-embodiment, social history, aspi-
rations for the future-also define individual identity . In this sense the broad
characteristics of racial difference are in fact only manifested in the lives of in-
dividuals . Du Bois suggests this notion of individual identity in his famous de-
scription of African American identity in his collection of essays The Souls of
Black Folk :
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After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian,
the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in
this American world-a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but
only lets him see through the revelation of the other world . It is a peculiar sensa-
tion, this double--consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through
the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on
in amused contempt and pity . One ever feels his two-ness-an American, a Negro;
two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings ; two warring ideals in one
dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.
(Du Bois 1903, pp. 364-65)
Notice the elements of the description . The body serves as the necessary ground
in terms of which one must understand oneself. The body is also what is seen
by others so that one is not only what one sees from one 's own eyes, but one is
in crucial ways almost literally what others see . Beyond the body and the self as
seen by others, one is also a self of "strivings" and ideals which take one beyond
one's present physical moment to a moment of self-definition . This definition
of one's self is constrained by the physical and social, but is not fully determined
by it . Du Bois continues (bracketing his gendered terms):
The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife,-this longing to
attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer
self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost . He would not
Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He
would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows
that Negro blood has a message for the world . He simply wishes to make it possible
for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit
upon by his fellows, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in
his face . (365)
Identity is to be understood as an embodied consciousness where individuals
are a complex of perspectives, histories, and aspirations joined together in a liv-
ing and active-that is, a striving-body.
If I ask who I am, I cannot properly answer "a thinking thing" in the manner
of Descartes, nor "a material thing" in the manner of contemporary materialists
like Paul Churchland, or even "a biological thing" in the manner of some "natu-
ralists ." For Du Bois, I am this body and material location in relation to char-
acteristic material things (looking a certain way, wearing certain clothes, living
in a certain place, and so on) . I am also this social creature-with a set of roles
and social relations (a teacher, a father, and a white man) . And I am someone
with certain dispositions and aspirations as well . I cannot be reduced to any of
these things, nor can any of these be set aside as mere epiphenomena irrelevant
to who I "really" am. This body constrains and enables social relations ; these
social relations constrain and enable these aspirations; these aspirations con-
strain and enable this body and material location. William James, with whom
Du Bois studied at Harvard, had a similar conception of the self, and, in a re-
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sponse to those who would define selves as "separate souls" free of embodied
constraints, James writes, "Unless our consciousness were something more than
cognitive, unless it experienced partiality for certain of the objects, which, in
succession occupy its ken, it could not long maintain itself in existence ; for, by
an inscrutable necessity, each human mind's appearance on this earth is condi-
tioned upon the integrity of the body with which it belongs, upon the treatment
which that body gets from others, and upon the spiritual dispositions which use
it as their tool, and lead it either towards longevity or to destruction" (James
1892, p. 194) . 8
Du Bois complicates the self that James proposes by recognizing that embod-
ied selves come to be in a historical moment such that distinctive morphological
differences play an overt role in how people sort themselves and others . The
resulting groupings that at first depend upon overt physical differences become
the contexts in which individuals develop other features (such as social practices
and future aspirations) which eventually are labeled as racial differences . Races,
as a result, are natural but contingent historical developments, and although
physical difference plays a role in this development, it is by no means a sufficient
condition for race identity nor a wholly determinant element in human lives. In
"The Conservation of Races" he gives a genealogy of race that emphasizes this
point:
Although the wonderful developments of human history teach that the grosser
physical differences of color, hair, and bone go but a short way toward explaining
the different roles which groups of men have played in Human Progress, yet there
are differences-subtle, delicate and elusive, though they may be-which have
silently but definitely separated men into groups . While these subtle forces have
generally followed the natural cleavage of common blood, descent and physical
peculiarities, they have at other times swept across and ignored these . (Du Bois
1897, pp . 816-17)
When we consider "real history," as Du Bois says, we find the "widespread, nay,
universal, prevalence of the race idea, the race spirit, the race ideal" (817) . It is
not, however, a prevalence that has in general blocked human progress and de-
velopment, but has been a way in which diversity has flourished to the benefit
of the widest human community.
This is not to say that the conception of race in general or of what it means
to be black or white has not changed over time, but it does suggest that race and
races are not just the product of prejudice and exclusion . Rather, race emerges
first as an aspect of life in a physically diverse world in which bodily differences
become connected with differences of intimate relations, interests, dress, cere-
monial forms, beliefs, aspirations, and so on. That race has come to be associated
with virulent prejudice, violence, and dehumanization has as much to do with
the attempt to eliminate race and its associated diversity in favor of a single way
of looking, thinking, and acting. Given the close connection between racial dif-
ferences and the ways in which people see themselves and others, the attempt
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to overlook race does not enhance the individual as an individual, but rather
undermines her. To set aside race is really only to suppress distinctiveness in
favor of some other ways of thinking and being which, from Du Bois 's natural-
istic perspective, can only have been the product of some particular racial his-
tory. The result is that the body, social location, and aspirations of individuals
not of the dominant race are seen as deficiencies and failings that must be over-
come. To live in such an environment and attempt to respond to the demands
to not be African American or Native American or Asian or Latin American is
itself a form of physical and psychological violence . As Du Bois puts it, under
such circumstances "The price of culture is a Lie" (Du Bois 1903, p . 504).
The idea of individual identity Du Bois proposes initially focuses on concep-
tions of race, but the general approach which identifies the importance of one's
physical and material place, one's social relations, and one's aspirations pro-
vides a general way to respond to other sorts of difference . Du Bois himself rec-
ognized that gender and economic class mark two other important kinds of
"family resemblance" that are, in part, constitutive of one's self in the context
of twentieth-century America. Despite the real and distinctive perspectives
possible from different gender and class "locations," the dominant thinking ad-
vocates that the same process of elimination demanded for race is demanded
for these perspectives . Even though women, on this view, have distinctive em-
bodied perspectives that connect with contributions to the wider community,
knowledge and insight classified as "women's" can only be ignored . Even though
the evils of poverty are best understood from the perspective of those suffering,
such perspectives must, from the dominant point of view, be set aside in favor
of the perspective imposed by those most distant from a life of poverty. In each
case Du Bois argues that the distinctiveness of these embodied lives must be
promoted rather than overlooked and suppressed in a way that will ameliorate
suffering and lead to growth .'
Race, then, for Du Bois becomes a transformative notion . By focusing on the
history and experience of race, he transforms James's notion of individual iden-
tity largely formed from the perspective of a privileged white academic to a
broader notion of identity that recognizes the categories that people in racial-
ized societies actually use to organize their own lives . In this way Du Bois is able
to avoid arguing that race is an a priori category in which humanity must be
understood, and instead argue for its status as a kind of organizing ideal. This
ideal, he argues in the celebrated first chapter of The Souls ofBlack Folk, emerges
in particular as one of the gifts of "Black Folk" to humanity. He says:
Work, culture, liberty-all these we need, not singly but together, not successively
but together, each growing and aiding each, and all striving toward that vaster
ideal that swims before the Negro people, the ideal of human brotherhood, gained
through the unifying ideal of Race; the ideal of fostering and developing traits and
talents of the Negro, not in opposition to or contempt for other races, but rather in
large conformity to the greater ideals of the American Republic, in order that some
day on American soil two world-races may give each to each those characteristics
both so sadly lack. (Du Bois 1903, p . 370)
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Equality and Difference
I began this paper by proposing that education in a democracy is faced
with a problem about the role of race in learning . It seemed that if we system-
atically recognize race we apparently undermine our democratic commitments
to equality and individuality. Du Bois, I think, gives us another perspective . If
we take up his perspective, then it appears that our identities are only human
but depend as well on how we look, our material circumstances, our histories,
and our dreams. Race as a term captures the aspect of our selves-developed
historically-that identifies the importance of certain physical, material, social,
and cultural characteristics . If this is so, then the recognition of race does not
undermine our commitment to individuality at all, but rather is necessary to it.
That such recognition locates individuals as members of groups not only does
not make them less individual, but grants standing to groups as well . When we
recall the university commitment to "true diversity," Du Bois gives us a concep-
tual standpoint from which such diversity can be promoted.
Equality is another matter. It appears that our commitment to the recogni-
tion of racial difference is bound to undermine the notion of equality at every
turn. Yet, by reconstructing the notion of individual identity, Du Bois also re-
constructs the notion of equality. In a 1929 debate on whether or not African
Americans should be "encouraged to seek cultural equality," Du Bois argues
against understanding equality as "absolute identity or similarity " among cul-
tures, but rather to understand equality as an expectation that each culture
has the potential to make an equally valuable "gift" to the wider community
(Du Bois 1929, pp 7-50) . Following this approach, equality among individuals
is not a comparison between the circumstances of individuals, but rather an
assessment of the circumstances of individuals with respect to their potential
to develop their particular "gift" to the community.
An example might be useful . Suppose a person is a talented musician but has
no opportunity to develop that talent . Perhaps through some community or-
ganization, the musician is provided with music lessons and a tuned piano . From
one perspective, some in the community will argue that since another person,
a talented painter, is not given music lessons, they are being treated unequally.
From Du Bois 's perspective, if the painter is in a position to develop her talents
and the musician his, then they are equally treated regardless of whether they
have "the same" opportunities . Equality is defined with respect to the growth
of individuals, not by antecedent or independent standards.
Consider a second example. One objection to bilingual education is that it
produces inequality in the learning environment by privileging bilingual stu-
dents with extra resources and opportunities and denying the same to those
who speak English only. Given the approach suggested by Du Bois, bilingual
education would be better understood as a response to the particular circum-
stances and the "gifts" of bilingual students . Contrary to the criticism, Du Bois
would find that failure to provide bilingual education or some appropriate al-
ternative would undermine equality by failing to respect the distinctive gifts of
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those students whose language needs are different from the majority. Similar
arguments could be made about affirmative action programs and educational
opportunity programs. In general, Du Bois reconstructs the notion of equality
by shifting the standard from blind comparison to relative comparisons within
particular circumstances . 10
On this approach, a democratic commitment to equality cannot ignore race
but, on the contrary, must recognize it as an aspect of the individuals who are
to be treated equally. Since one's race negatively and positively supports and
constrains what one does, if we are interested in an equality of gifts, we must
also be interested in promoting those aspects of life which enable these gifts.
Again, from Du Bois 's perspective, individuality and now equality in our present
time and place demand that we recognize race.
But what are the implications of this approach for the place of race in learn-
ing? It is interesting to see that in 1955, shortly after the Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation Supreme Court decision that reversed the PIessy v. Ferguson decision and
established the legal requirement for integrated schools, Du Bois gave a talk in
which he made two important observations. First, the Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation decision was long sought and much needed but would come at a high
price. "With successfully mixed schools ;" he said, African Americans "know
what their children must suffer for years from southern white teachers, from
white hoodlums who sit beside them and under school abithorities from janitor
to superintendents, who hate and despise them ." These new circumstances will
also change how race is conceived : African Americans "must eventually surren-
der race `solidarity' and the idea of American Negro culture to the concept of
world humanity, above race and nation . This is the price of liberty. This is the
cost of oppression" (1955, p . 283). Despite this surrender, however, Du Bois ob-
served that, second, African American culture will persist and must . "It's just
one more long battle," he concluded, "but we are ready to fight it" (284) . From
a vantage point nearly fifty years later we may be able to heed the implicit
warning and address the issue of race and learning in a more careful way than
through uniform integration, now informed by Du Bois's conceptions of race
and identity.
If we follow Du Bois's thinking, it seems clear that race and learning must
not be separated, but rather they must be brought together. If we are in part
constituted by the contingent developments of racial inheritance and our view
of ourselves and others is framed by how we are seen by others in racial terms,
then it seems clear that whatever our gifts as teachers and students, they will
be realized only in an environment where race plays a role . This conclusion is
perhaps not easy for anyone . Taken seriously, it means that the university, for
example, ought to take an active role in making itself an environment that pro-
motes "true diversity" in general and racial diversity in particular . For the uni-
versity, this means a transformation from every perspective : the student popu-
lation would become more diverse, as would the faculty and the administration.
It also means that the university curriculum would change, not only by incor-
porating an ethnic studies program, but by incorporating opportunities to un-
196 Scott L . Pratt
derstand racial difference, history, and possibilities across all departments and
courses.
The impact of such a change in approach would be most striking, 1 think,
for those of us who are white . The usual fear on everyone's part is that attention
to whiteness can lead only to claims of supremacy on one hand and guilt on the
other. Both conclusions, I think, extend from a notion of race that Du Bois
would have us set aside . In fact, Du Bois was one of the first to theorize publicly
and at length about whiteness . His essay in Darkwater, "The Souls of White
Folk" (1920), and the chapter of his autobiography Dusk of Dawn, entitled "The
White World" (1940), show how his conception of individual identity can make
race an issue even for those of us who assume that only other people are racial.
From Du Bois's perspective, whiteness, like blackness or brownness or Indian-
ness, combines a range of bodily features, a history of social relations, and as-
pirations for the future for purposes of conservation as well as criticism and
reconstruction.
If race is taken personally, white people would be immediately aware that at
least part of who they are is how they-or rather we-are seen by those who
understand themselves to be racially different . While we may think that such
views of ourselves do not matter, they do, both in what is possible for those of
us with "white" bodies and in what is not possible . That we have overlooked
these opportunities and constraints is not proof that they do not exist, but
rather that we have been so possessed of overconfidence and single-mindedness
-perhaps overpossessed of Western philosophy-that we have failed to see
what African American, Native American, and Latino and Latina authors have
long been saying. In the context of learning, attending to the distinctiveness of
our bodies, the histories that have produced them, and their implications for
our future is a way to attend to how we are heard and how we listen.
By consciousler placing race into the context and process of learning, white
people will also come to notice the ways in which they have been advantaged by
social and economic history and how these same relations though transformed
in various ways still play an important role in what we teach and what we learn.
Once we recognize our whiteness, we recognize as well the way in which we
speak with authority and are heard, often without challenge, and sometimes
with rage. When we speak in class, we are not speaking as disembodied "human
beings" who are defined only by what we have in common with those who are
racially different ; we are also embodied white people who are what we are be-
cause of a history of white prejudice, economic exploitation, and genocide.
When a student of color speaks with anger or refuses to speak, it is not just a
matter of so-called academic ability, as some would say, but something con-
nected in part to a long history of what we-the student and the teacher-bring
to the classroom . When a student of color speaks with rage, it is not, on this
view, mere bad behavior, but something grounded in a larger circumstance and
must be dealt with, not dismissed.
Finally, the aspirations which make us in part who we are are not separate
from how we are viewed by others, from our histories, and from our bodies.
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Aspirations are about what we think possible and, at least as importantly, what
we think valuable . We set goals for ourselves in light of what we have come
to value and in light of what we believe to be possible for ourselves . One of
Du Bois's charges against African Americans is that they had come to value the
gifts of white folk but not their own. The problem from the white perspec-
tive is that many of us have come to value gifts and futures that are consis-
tent with what we take to be a line of development of what Du Bois called the
"childish idea of progress" (Du Bois 1971, p . 64)
.
To value progress is to value
"bigger better results always and forever" regardless of the cost . At first glance,
in the context of education it may seem that the distinctive aspirations associ-
ated with racial difference are best seen as motivating ideas whose only real con-
sequence is in whether one moves forward in a course or toward a degree . Per-
haps this is right, but to notice that one's values also structure one's thinking
about subject matters and even whether teachers think that a student is success-
ful merits further consideration . When aspirations become dominant and are
imposed without regard to the persons on whom they are imposed, even the
most "noble" values and aspirations become oppressive . As white teachers, for
example, some of us become convinced that the standards of success that we
adopt based on our own history are the only standards and are also the ones we
ought to instantiate in our students . At times, I would say, such unthinking im-
positions result only in tragedy. There is, I think, no solace in thinking that such
a tragedy is for the best since the unfortunate student was not up to the chal-
lenge.
By bringing race and learning together Du Bois would have white educators
realize that aspirations and values are as much a part of one's identity as social
location and skin color. From the perspective of an educator, this realization
should compel us to pay careful attention to the role our aspirations play in the
classroom and the extent to which the aspirations that are part of each student's
life can come into play.
One might argue that while we are recognizing difference, it appears that we
are also losing the possibility of a critical perspective . I think that this is mis-
taken. Du Bois is the last to accept an uncritical stance . From his view, awareness
of issues is the first step to assessing the circumstances and taking seriously a
commitment to the gifts each person has to offer. For whites to critically assess
the role of whiteness in learning is not some process of guilt assignment, but
rather a genuine effort to see the ways in which race affects one's self and the
process of teaching and learning . To adopt the sort of position advocated by
Du Bois is to come to focus on the possibility of individual growth, the equality
and value of individual gifts. To critically assess the role of racial identity in
general and the role of "whiteness" in particular with respect to gifts is to dis-
cover ways in which some gifts are suppressed and undermined and, in so doing,
find ways of changing the situation . To critically engage the general theory of
race and conceptions of blackness, brownness, and American Indianness is to
find ways to enrich the process of learning for all students . When issues of race
are attended to, faculty and students can more directly avoid the behaviors that
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block the development of gifts and actively (and even at times passively) struc-
ture relations in a way that respects individual identities and their gifts to come.
The place of race in learning is complex, but in light of Du Bois 's approach
several concluding observations can be made . First, if race, at least race of the
sort understood by Du Bois, is taken seriously, then it will conserve distinctive-
ness, not as strictly individual distinctiveness, but as shared difference informed
by a history and place, one always growing and transforming. Second, if taken
seriously, what we learn from attention to race is how it is to see the world from
other perspectives-for those interested in the pursuit of truth, it is to see the
world more truly. Third, race in the context of education provides a context in
which to understand the moments of human flourishing and the moments of
human suffering . To listen to one another across racial difference is to see prob-
lems as they are experienced and so to be able to address them . Fourth, making
race an integral part of learning is to have a context for self-discovery and critique.
To see the ways in which being white in early-twenty-first-century America af-
fects the qualities and possibilities of my life will lead me to better understand
the ways in which my identity is formed and undermined by racial oppression.
The University of Oregon mission statement calls for equality and individu-
ality in a context of diversity. What we can learn from Du Bois is that equality
amounts to equality of recognition of difference of individuals both as they are
located in the world and as they embody race . If we are obliged to do anything
with respect to race, it is to recognize its pervasive character, its consequences,
for good and evil, and its transformative possibilities . In the end, democracy
depends upon such education. In the conclusion of his 1946 assessment of the
place of Africa in the developing postwar world, Du Bois concludes with this
message :
Reader of dead words whe'would live deeds, this is the flowering of my logic : I
dream of a world of infinite and invaluable variety ; not in the laws of gravity or
atomic weights, but in human variety in height and weight, color and skin, hair
and nose and lip. But more especially and far above and beyond this, in a realm of
true freedom: in thought and dream, fantasy and imagination; in gift, aptitude,
and genius-all possible manner of difference, topped with freedom of the soul to
do and be ; and freedom of thought to give to a world and build into it, all wealth
of inborn individuality. Each effort to stop this freedom of being is a blow at
democracy-that real democracy which is reservoir and opportunity. . . . There
can be no perfect democracy curtailed by color, race, or poverty. But with all we
accomplish all, even Peace . (1946, p. 261)
NOTES
An earlier version of this essay, entitled "Race and Learning," was given as a Black
History Month address at the University of Oregon, 23 February 1998.
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1.
	
From the University of Oregon Bulletin, 2002-3,
http:lldarkwing.uoregon.edul--uopubs/bulletin/welcome_index .shtml.
2. See Appiah (1990a), for example . Also see Zack (1998) for an excellent sur-
vey of the various theoretical approaches to understanding and responding
to race.
3.
	
When Cornel West spoke at the University of Oregon, he told the story of
Casper Weinberger's comment on Colin Powell : "When I look at Powell,"
Weinberger said, "I see a man ." West asked : "What do you think that Colin
saw?" African Americans, West stated, have developed the ability to see race
without losing track of humanity. "What Colin saw," West concluded, "was
a man who is white."
4.
	
The classification of Du Bois's work is controversial . Some claim that he
adopts an existentialist framework (Lewis Gordon 1997) ; others argue that
he should be seen as Hegelian (Zamir 1995) . Of course, Du Bois's work is
large and complex enough to sustain a variety of interpretations . Neverthe-
less, a strong case can be made for Du Bois as part of the pragmatist move-
ment that began in the late 1890s with the work of William James . Du Bois
was a student of James at Harvard at the time James was completing The
Principles of Psychology (1890) . Du Bois mentions James 's influence many
times in his published work including his final autobiography written in the
1950s . Here he writes that his initial study of philosophy at Fisk University
"eventually landed me squarely in the arms of William James of Harvard,
for which God be praised" (1968, p. 127) . And it was James, Du Bois says,
who "guided [him] out of the sterilities of scholastic philosophy to realist
pragmatism" (133). Du Bois's earliest work appears to be influenced by his-
torians such as Albert Bushnell Hart, black activists and theorists such as
Alexander Crummell, and social researcher/reformers such as Jane Addams.
Du Bois's early study of the black community in Philadelphia, The Philadel-
phia Negro (1899), in fact, was modeled on a pragmatist-framed study by
Addams and her colleagues entitled Hull House Maps and Papers : A Presenta-
tion ofNationalities and Wages in a Congested District of Chicago, Together
with Comments and Essays on Problems Growing out of the Social Conditions
(Addams et al. 1895). Most importantly, his work over his long career is
focused on the reconstruction of American society in ways that parallel the
efforts of Addams and Dewey and are compatible with the kind of transfor-
mative pragmatism recently discussed by Michael Eldridge (1998) and Erin
McKenna (2001) . His work is also consistent with what I have argued are
the central commitments of classical pragmatism (Pratt 2002, chap . 2).
5.
	
See Zack (1994) for a good example of this argument.
6.
	
This view is implicit in the work of Appiah (1990b), and long a part of
anthropological views of race of the sort made prominent by Franz Boas
in the early twentieth century. See Boas (1940).
7.
	
Here the "ideal" marks the end of the need for the active conservation
of races, but not the end of difference, since the ideal of "brotherhood"
involves the expectation of both continued diversity among peoples and
their mutual support as members of a wider "family ."
8.
	
James introduces the idea that selves as known are complexes made up
of what he calls a material self, a social self, and a spiritual self. The
view roughly anticipates Du Bois's notion of the self in The Souls of Black
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Folk. Much of the social theory of George Herbert Mead, Josiah Royce,
Jane Addams, and John Dewey can be seen as predicated on adopting a
version of James 's notion of the self. See James (1890, chap . X; 1892,
chap . XII).
9.
	
See Du Bois's essays "The Damnation of Women" and Of the Ruling of
Men" in Darkwater (1920), as well as The World and Africa (1946), and
many of his essays in Du Bois Speaks (1970a, 1970b).
10. His approach is not unlike Dewey's idea that education needs to be framed
around the particular needs and circumstances of students and their com-
munities . See Dewey (1938).
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